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6 China’s tax policy response to 
the global fi nancial crisis
Wei Cui
On 4 August 2008, two unusually trenchant pieces of commentary on China’s 
tax policy appeared in Caijing magazine (Xu 2008, Liu 2008). Both took aim 
at China’s production-type VAT (value added tax), which differed from the 
international standard consumption-type VAT in that it did not allow the VAT 
that producers paid on purchases of equipment and other fi xed assets to be 
credited against VAT due on output. This resulted in the nonconsumed 
portion of GDP being subject to VAT,1 which distorted both production and 
consumption decisions. The fi rst piece was by Xu Shanda, a former deputy 
minister of  the State Administration of  Taxation (SAT). Xu chastised the 
government’s long-standing hesitation to reform VAT. According to him, 
the conversion to a consumption-type VAT should have happened during the 
defl ationary aftermath of the Asian fi nancial crisis in 1997, but the government 
had been too worried that such conversion would result in reduced revenue. 
What would have been wrong with a little bit of defi cit to fi nance tax reform, 
Xu asked, especially if  the reform, by removing a tax on business investment, 
would have had the effect of  stimulating investment, which the government 
was trying to do in 1998 anyway? After 2003, once infl ation rather than 
defl ation became the primary concern, VAT reform was delayed for the 
opposite reason: the government was afraid that it would stimulate the 
economy too much, and, in any case, policymakers might have felt that reform 
was unnecessary, despite the ineffi ciencies of the production-type VAT, given 
how well the economy was going. The result, Xu pointed out, was that there 
was no backing for tax reform during either boom times or downturns. 
Fortunately, he claimed, the State Council might occasionally rise above such 
a political quagmire, and, once a decision was made, VAT reform could be 
implemented without a glitch. 
The second essay, by Liu Shangxi from the Fiscal Science Research Institute 
of  the Ministry of  Finance (MoF), began with the statement: “The most 
important issue is not always the most urgent; the most urgent issue is not 
always the most important. But VAT reform is both most important and most 
urgent.” The reasons he gave for the importance of VAT reform were many 
(e.g. VAT was too narrow in scope and left the service sector to the cascading 
Business Tax), but the urgency he felt was clearly traceable to one item: the 
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rapid growth in tax revenue China witnessed in 2007 and the fi rst half  of 
2008.2 Liu’s argument appeared to be: fi nally, we can afford VAT reform. 
The actual turns of events during the rest of 2008 simultaneously belied and 
fulfi lled Xu’s and Liu’s prophesies. As the spreading global recession slowed 
China’s export growth in the latter half  of 2008, year-on-year tax revenue 
growth went into an even faster decline, and became negative in October, 
November and December (Ministry of Finance 2008, 2009a). Before boom-
time indifference to tax reform could be overcome, it seemed, fi scal conservatism 
during downturns might rapidly return. This highly unusual circumstance, 
however, also produced a response that was quite unusual in terms of the 
ordinary politics of Chinese tax policy: in early November, in the same week 
that the State Council announced the “4 trillion yuan” stimulus package, it also 
announced the decision to complete the conversion of China’s VAT into the 
consumption type, effective on 1 January 2009.3 A tax reform measure that had 
been advocated for over ten years was fi nally brought into fruition by the global 
fi nancial crisis (GFC).
We will see below that VAT reform constituted the most important tax 
policy action China took during 2008–9. Of course, if  China had had a more 
typical tax structure, this specifi c policy instrument, as well as certain others, 
would not have been available. Conversely, because of the idiosyncrasies of 
China’s current tax structure, some of the policy measures commonly deployed 
in other countries also cannot be used. In comparing the tax policies adopted 
by China and Europe since 2008, therefore, major differences in prior tax 
structures must be taken into account. But there are also two other potential 
determinants of China’s tax policy, both alluded to in Xu Shanda’s essay. One 
is the Chinese government’s general propensity (or lack thereof) to use taxation 
as an instrument of economic policy. The other is the fate of fundamental tax 
reforms, in the absence of which tax policy options that have macroeconomic 
signifi cance are limited. This essay makes a preliminary attempt at analyzing 
these two additional factors, after fi rst chronicling the signifi cant tax policy 
measures that China has adopted since 2008 and comparing them with what 
happened in Europe. 
China’s tax policy responses to the consequences of the GFC
During 2007, before the GFC could have been widely anticipated, China 
adopted several important tax reduction measures, foremost among which 
was the passage of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law). The new EIT 
Law, which took effect at the beginning of  2008, accomplished the long-
overdue, widely supported integration of the previously separate corporate 
income tax regimes for domestically and foreign-invested enterprises, and 
reduced the nominal income tax rate for domestically-owned enterprises 
from 33 percent to 25 percent. The effective tax rate for these enterprises 
was further lowered thanks to the removal of a host of unjustifi able limitations 
on deductions of  expenses.4 This reduction in corporate income tax is 
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consistent with trends in EU countries, and indeed in OECD countries 
in general (European Commission 2010a), and was part of  the long-term 
strategy of  “structural tax reduction” (jiegouxing jianshui) pursued by the 
Chinese government, aimed at broadening the tax base and lowering tax rates 
at the same time.
A reduction of the personal income tax (PIT) rate on deposit interest from 
20 percent to 5 percent, as well as a popular policy that raised the monthly 
deduction amount under the PIT for wage income to 2,000 yuan a month, 
also came to pass by the end of 2007. The former policy should have been 
controversial, because the administrative cost of  collecting PIT on interest 
was very low, and it is widely believed that Chinese individual saving behavior 
is relatively inelastic and would not be easily distorted by taxes. In other words, 
the tax on deposit interest was economically effi cient. It was believed by some 
to be unfair, however, because the poorer segments of  the population kept 
more of  their savings in the form of bank deposits, whereas richer people 
invested in assets, the returns on which were not always subject to effective tax 
collection. Even so, given that PIT collected on interest income represented a 
healthy 16 percent of total PIT collection (and 1 percent of total tax revenue) 
in 2007, it seems that one could have chosen to cut other taxes that were both 
ineffi cient and regressive, such as production-type VAT. In 2007, however, 
there was still not enough momentum for such additional reform.
The increase in wage deductions was also signifi cant. The monthly deduction 
for wages had been increased as recently as 2005. Two thousand yuan per 
month was roughly the median income of the Chinese urban population in 
2007; the deduction thus excluded altogether about half  of  that population 
(plus basically the entire rural populace) from the PIT on wages. According to 
the estimate of the MoF, after taking into account other deductions, even a 
person earning 10,000 yuan of wages a month (i.e. someone well into the top 
5 percent of  income in the entire Chinese population) was only subject to 
an average PIT rate of  8.3 percent (Ministry of  Finance 2009b). Indeed, 
PIT revenue as a proportion of  total tax revenue went into steady decline 
after 2007.5 The narrowness of the PIT tax base directly implies that, during 
2008–9, PIT could not have been an area of meaningful policy action.
Tax policies specifi cally responding to the global economic recession did 
not appear until summer 2008. In August, China began a series of increases 
in the rates at which VAT borne by various categories of exported products is 
refunded to exporters. Globally, countries with VATs generally tax the import 
of  goods and completely refund any VAT borne by exported goods. In a 
relatively unique arrangement, China offers export refunds only selectively 
and at quite a varied set of rates, thus essentially imposing a set of excise taxes 
on exports.6 Increasing VAT refund rates amounts to reducing these excise 
taxes. The size of these tax cuts in 2008–9 was signifi cant: export refund grew 
by 10.6 percent in 2009 over 2008 (Ministry of  Finance 2010b) despite 
a decline of  13.9 percent in the total value of  exports, implying well over 
100 billion yuan of foregone revenue. Like some of the other policy measures 
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discussed next, the increase in export refunds is a tool that one would not 
expect to fi nd elsewhere in the world. 
The reform of  VAT announced in November 2008 involved not only 
allowing taxpayers to claim input tax credit for fi xed asset purchases, but also 
reducing by half  the tax rate applicable to small taxpayers, and increasing the 
minimal thresholds under which businesses would be exempt from VAT (and 
the Business Tax). Although there are no published offi cial estimates, the 
change for small taxpayers alone could have implied a tax cut of  between 
30 and 40 billion yuan in 2009.7 The next tax cut targeted at small businesses, 
however, did not come until the end of 2009, and its magnitude was small: the 
EIT rate applicable to small businesses would be reduced from 20 percent to 
10 percent for taxpayers earning less than 30,000 yuan of taxable income in 
2010. Since taxpayers operating at this scale are usually taxed on the basis of 
deemed instead of  actual profi ts, it was unclear how effective this item of 
policy would turn out to be.
In any case, between 2008 and 2009, the Chinese press reports on tax cuts 
focused instead on two other areas. One was reductions in transaction taxes, 
especially ones directed at more speculative parts of the Chinese economy. For 
example, the stamp duty on securities transactions was cut twice, likely in 
order to signal the government’s willingness to support the stability of  the 
stock market, just as stamp duty increases had been used before to express 
concern about over-speculation. (Stamp tax rates on securities transactions 
were adjusted nine times between 1990 and 2010.) Similarly, changing Business 
Tax (BT), Deed Tax, Land Appreciation Tax, and stamp duty policies for the 
secondary housing market merely continued a history of cyclical adjustments.8 
The preferential BT policy on residential property adopted in December 2008, 
for example, was strict by historical standards, and in any case it was reversed 
in 2009, after it had become clear that the GFC would not stop real estate 
speculation in China. The one excise tax cut aimed at real consumption was a 
vehicle purchase tax rate reduction (from 10 percent to 5 percent) for small 
vehicle purchases in 2009 and 2010, which may have contributed to the healthy 
revival of consumer automobile sales in the second half  of 2009. 
The other area of  potential tax cuts subject to intense media focus was 
possible PIT reductions. The already preferential 5 percent rate on interest 
income from bank deposits was reduced to zero in October 2008, but the real 
heat was on increasing the monthly deduction for wage income. Rumors of 
increases circulated through different press outlets despite multiple debunkings. 
There was little evidence that such a tax cut (with strongly regressive effects) 
would stimulate domestic consumption, however, and, much to its credit, the 
government did not budge. 
In early 2009, the MoF estimated that tax reductions adopted since late 
2008 would result in RMB 500 billion of lost revenue in 2009 (Ministry of 
Finance 2009c). This amount would turn out to be roughly 8.5 percent of 
actual revenue collected during the year. The conversion to consumption-type 
VAT (within VAT’s current scope) alone was predicted to cost the government 
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RMB 123 billion.9 Increases in export tax rebate, and the cuts in securities 
stamp tax and transactional taxes applicable to real estate transfers, were also 
included in the estimate. (It is unclear how revenue estimates for the reductions 
of taxes on real estate and stock transfers were calculated, given that the total 
value of such transactions can be quite volatile. Commercial real estate sales, 
for example, fell by 15 percent in 2008 over 2007, only to grow by 75.5 percent 
in 2009. It is also unclear whether the effect of the new EIT law, in its second 
year of implementation, was also counted in this estimate, which would result 
in overstating the impact of  government actions taken in response to the 
GFC.) In addition, over 100 items of miscellaneous government fees were also 
canceled, with an expected cost of 36 billion yuan to the government in 2009.10
Like other countries, of  course, the Chinese government also enacted 
revenue raisers to counter the budgetary impact of tax cuts. The privilege of 
group consolidation reporting (which allowed members of a corporate group 
to use losses of  one to offset profi t of  another), previously granted to 106 
state-owned enterprises and estimated to cost the government 40 billion yuan 
per year,11 was ended at the beginning of 2009 (Ministry of Finance and State 
Administration of  Taxation 2008). Stricter enforcement led EIT collection 
from foreigners to grow rapidly (Securities Times 2009). But, as the economic 
downturn threatened the tax revenues of both national and local governments, 
something less benign began to emerge. Despite projected economic slowdown 
and tax cuts, the government set a nationwide target for revenue growth of 
8.2 percent over 2008.12 Throughout 2009, evidence emerged of  local tax 
bureaus attempting to meet this target through illegal means. The city of 
Wuxi, Jiangsu, for example, issued a set of  rules for the “pre-collection” 
of  income tax on dividends with respect to individual shareholders on 
undistributed profi ts of  companies (Wuxi Local Tax Bureau 2009). Hebei 
Province required any recipient of a gift of  stock from anyone other than a 
family member to pay tax at the capital gains rate on the entire value of the 
stock received (Hebei Local Tax Bureau 2009). 
More importantly, after tax revenue experienced 6 percent negative growth 
(year-on-year) during the fi rst half  of 2009, the SAT, under a mandate said to 
come directly from the State Council, ordered a nationwide tax audit campaign 
in order to enhance tax collection (Xi 2010). Audit departments of local tax 
bureaus were given targets of  additional revenue generation set at twice the 
revenue collected from audits for 2008. The result was spectacular: revenue 
collected as a result of  special audits in 2009 was 119.2 billion yuan, which 
exceeded the sum of  audit-generated revenue from 2006 to 2008.13 This 
dramatic increase in collection, however, must be understood in light of 
the fact that Chinese local tax agencies’ capacity for carrying out effective 
audits is quite limited. “Enhanced audits” often simply mean setting higher 
expectations in negotiations for tax payment with all taxpayers, instead of any 
targeted action against noncompliance by specifi c persons. The audit campaign 
thus effectively amounted to an across-the-board tax increase, and was widely 
perceived to run counter to the policy of  tax reduction (Wang et al. 2009). 
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Interestingly, news reports suggest that the last time such an audit mobilization 
occurred was during 1998, after the Asian fi nancial crisis (Xi 2010). According 
to this report, audit teams nationwide were mobilized in the fourth quarter of 
1998, and, disturbingly, increasing penalties over which tax offi cials had 
discretion had also become a device for increasing revenue intake.
Table 6.1 lays out the chronology of signifi cant tax policy measures during 
2008–9, whereas Table 6.2 displays the actual revenue outcome for 2009. As a 
result of both tax cuts and slower economic growth, 2009 tax revenue growth 
over 2008 was only 5.7 percent (after discounting tax revenue increase 
from the absorption of  transportation and road fees into the Excise Tax 
(xiaofeishui)),14 in sharp contrast to the high growth rates of the preceding fi ve 
years. (Tax revenue grew by 20.7 percent, 19.1 percent, 18.6 percent, 33.7 
percent and 18.8 percent during 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively.) 
The growth patterns of  revenue from specifi c taxes are also interesting. As 
might be expected, total VAT revenue (net of  export refunds) experienced 
signifi cantly below-average growth. Rate cuts also resulted in a big drop 
in stamp duty revenue, despite a doubling of  trade volume on the stock 
market. Some of the other transaction taxes nominally subject to rate cuts, 
however, generated signifi cantly above-average revenue growth: the real-estate 
Table 6.1 Chronology of signifi cant Chinese tax policy measures, 2008–9
April 2008 Security transfer stamp tax reduced from 0.3 percent to 0.1 
percent
August 2008– 
 June 2009 
Rates of rebate of export VAT on selective products raised seven 
times
September 2008 Security transfer stamp tax halved by requiring only buyer to pay
October 2008 Elimination of personal income tax on deposit interest
October 2008 Exemption from stamp tax on individual sale or purchase of real 
property; exemption from land appreciation tax of individual sale 
of real property
November 2008 Reduction of deed tax rate for certain purchases of fi rst 
apartments 
November 2008 Comprehensive VAT reform, effective 1 January 2009: input credit 
allowed for purchase of fi xed assets; lower rates for small 
taxpayers
December 2008 Easing of BT policy on individual sales of residential housing 
(effective for one year, 2009)
December 2008 Imposition of excise tax on fi nished oil, to replace six types of fees 
(intended to be revenue-neutral) 
January 2009 Reduction of vehicle taxes on purchases of small vehicles 
(effective for one year, subsequently extended to 2010); RMB 5 
billion subsidy program for retirement of ineffi cient vehicles
April 2009 Limited BT exemptions for exported services adopted
 December 2009 EIT rate reduction from 20 percent to 10 percent in 2010 for 
enterprises with less than RMB 30,000 of annual taxable income 
December 2009 Return to tighter BT policy on sale of residential property 
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component of the Business Tax, the Deed Tax, and the Vehicle Purchase Tax. 
Other real-estate-related taxes also witnessed signifi cant revenue growth. 
Given that the income taxes experienced below-average growth, the overall tax 
mix shifted towards excise/transaction taxes and property taxes in 2009.
Comparison with EU countries 
According to a recent report by the European Commission, “tax policies have 
played an important role in countering the fi nancial and economic crisis” in 
EU member countries (European Commission 2010b: 7). A preliminary 
comparison of activist tax policy responses to the fi nancial crisis in Europe 
and in China yields the following observations:
1. China’s ratio of fi scal expenditure to GDP increased from 19.26 percent
in 2007 to 20.82 percent in 2008 and 22.63 percent in 2009, which was
smaller than, but comparable to, the 4 percentage point increase in
expenditure ratio in the EU as a whole from 2008 to 2010 (European
Commission 2010b: 16).15
Table 6.2 2009 tax revenue breakdown
Type of tax Percent of total 
tax revenue
Growth rate over 2008
(percent)
Total tax revenue 100 9.8 (5.7–6.7 after 
discounting fee-to-
tax conversion)
Domestic VAT (net of export 
refund)
20.15 2.3 in gross revenue, 
10.6 in refund, −1.14 
net
Enterprise income tax 19.38 3.2
Business tax 15.15 18.2
VAT and excise on import 12.99 4.6
Domestic excise 8.00 85.3 (20.93 after discounting 
fee-to-tax conversion)
Personal income tax 6.64 6.1
Deed tax 2.92 32.7
Tariff 2.49 −16.2
Vehicle and vessels purchase tax 1.95 17.5
Urban land use tax 1.55 12.7
Real estate tax 1.35 18.1
Land appreciation tax 1.21 33.9
Tax on use of agricultural land 1.06 101.3
Stamp tax on securities 
transactions
0.86 −47.9
Resource tax 0.57 12.1
Other miscellaneous taxes 3.74 −14.4
Source: Ministry of Finance 2009b
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2. China’s ratio of total tax and nontax revenue to GDP experienced slight
increases (19.95 percent, 20.40 percent, and 20.42 percent for 2007, 2008,
and 2009), in contrast to the slight fall in aggregate revenue ratios in
Europe (European Commission 2010b). In other words, tax cuts did not
reduce total revenue intake as a percentage of GDP in China.
3. Once the effect of the one-time conversion of six types of fees into taxes
is factored out, China’s ratio of total tax revenue to GDP did decline as a
result of tax cuts. The 500 billion yuan in projected tax cuts represented
1.49 percent of 2009 GDP, implying a much greater tax policy response
than the EU average. (The majority of  the measures adopted in EU
countries have had an estimated budgetary impact of well below a half
point of GDP.) In both Europe and China, however, the absolute amount
of  tax cuts paled against increased government spending (European
Commission 2010b: 30, 16). In China, the cost of  tax cuts represented
only 40 percent of increased spending.
4. In EU countries, cuts dominated in corporate and personal income
taxation, while increases were clearly prevalent in excise duties and
VAT. In fact, “one of the effects of the crisis on tax systems seems to be
a reinforcement of  the trend of  the last few years towards higher
consumption taxes” (European Commission 2010b: 31).16 This is opposite 
to the choice of policy instruments in China, where the dominant portion
of tax cuts comprised VAT reductions (including both increases in export
refund and the conversion to a VAT of  the consumption type) and
reductions in excise taxes (e.g. for vehicle and housing purchases).
5. “[O]ne of the most common types of measure [in Europe] was the direct
support of  household spending power by reductions in the PIT.”17
However, because of the structural limitations of the Chinese PIT, only a
reduction in the tax on bank deposit interest was adopted in China.
Assistance to low-income households otherwise took the form of cash or
in-kind subsidies instead of tax expenditures.18
6. Social security contributions (SSC) and similar taxes increased as a total
percentage of  government revenue in Europe, as a result of  both the
relative stability of  wages and government measures to support wage
levels (European Commission 2010b: 18). In China, social security fees do 
not count as tax revenue and, indeed, do not even appear in the general
budget. Nonetheless, social security fee collection did grow by 17 percent
in 2009 (Ministry of Finance 2010a), faster than tax revenue growth. This
may be considered a parallel development to the European shift towards
higher SSC proportion of revenue after the crisis.19
While observations 1–3 and 6 identify similarities between China’s tax policy 
response to the GFC and those found in the EU, observations 4 and 5 point 
to divergences that are symptomatic of  larger background differences.20 In 
exploring these differences, at least two broad questions may be raised. One is 
whether the Chinese government could have done more by way of tax cuts, or 
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at least could have eschewed the nationwide audit campaign in 2009 (and the 
extraordinary revenue it generated), which in all likelihood did not permanently 
improve compliance but only amounted to a one-time extraction from the 
economy during a diffi cult time. This question is particularly pointed given 
that the central government is believed to have been hoarding cash in the 
treasury, and much of the central expenditure budget has been drawn down 
very slowly in the last two years (Wang et al. 2009). Against this suggestion, 
however, it may be pointed out that there are important political forces 
in China that favor the use of  expenditure policy over tax policy. Most 
fundamentally, the control of expenditure may be a powerful way of building 
factions and patronages within the state apparatus, whereas granting relief  
to taxpayers may generate few political benefi ts within a nondemocratic 
system. And, when mechanisms for transmitting budgetary revenue to actual 
expenditures are ineffi cient, higher spending goals – such as were set during 
2008–9, especially for local governments –may also imply greater incentives to 
secure revenue.21 
A second, related question is the following. The European Commission’s 
report found that “tax reforms enacted [by EU member countries during 
2008–9] have been broadly in line with recent trends in tax policy,” especially 
in terms of reduction of taxes on labor (European Commission 2010b: 7). In 
the Chinese context, while the conversion to consumption-type VAT clearly 
moved the tax system in the right direction for the long term, many other 
measures did not necessarily refl ect views about permanent reform. For 
example, the tax cuts on real estate, vehicle, and securities transactions either 
have already been reversed or may be reversed in the future, and in July 2010 
VAT export refunds were revoked for six categories of  products (406 items) 
(Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation 2010). Whether 
the tax mix should be moving towards the current miscellany of excise taxes, 
as it did in 2009, is also subject to debate. Finally, since, unlike Europe, the PIT 
base is very narrow in China, the long-term trend should be a rise in the share 
of  PIT in total revenue. The below-average PIT growth in 2009, therefore, 
ought not to be regarded as a part of long-term tax policy. 
Options and prospects for future reform
Where, then, have the policy measures since 2008 positioned China in terms 
of the trajectory for future tax reform? 
As a result of the decision to pursue VAT reform at the end of 2008, further 
changes to China’s indirect taxes have gained surprising momentum. The 
integration of VAT and Business Tax (BT), in particular, is being discussed 
much more frequently than could have been predicted two years ago.22 BT, 
which generally applies to services and the transfer of  real and intangible 
properties, covers a tax base that is normally covered by VAT in other 
countries, but is a cascading tax imposed at rates (typically 5 percent) lower 
than regular VAT rates. Its eventual unifi cation with VAT had been anticipated 
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ever since the two taxes were given their current shape in 1993 (Xu 2008). 
Integrating the two taxes will give VAT taxpayers the ability to credit taxes 
paid on input purchases of services, intellectual property and other intangibles, 
and real property against VAT on output, which should have a pervasive 
disinfl ationary effect on both domestically consumed and exported goods. 
Moreover, the elimination of  cascading could remove many behavioral 
distortions and result in large effi ciency gains, while being revenue-neutral. 
In short, from the perspective of  tax design, VAT/BT integration is a very 
attractive reform option.
However, unlike VAT, which is split 75/25 between central and local 
governments, BT is almost 100 percent a local tax, is the largest source of tax 
revenue for most local governments, and is administered by local tax bureau 
systems that do not collect VAT. Anyone proposing to integrate the two taxes 
in favor of a comprehensive VAT, therefore, must explain how to compensate 
local governments for lost revenue and address the implications of  the 
elimination of a major part of tax bureaucracy. The proponent must also deal 
with a host of technical problems, such as (i) designing rules for the real estate 
and fi nancial sectors, which, internationally, are regarded as raising special 
problems for VAT design, but which currently together generate over 60 
percent of BT revenue; and (2) reconciling the current costly system of VAT 
administration with the prevalence of small businesses among BT taxpayers. 
Like all fundamental tax reform proposals, therefore, VAT reform still 
possesses something of the character of a political orphan. According to the 
mentality Xu Shanda ascribes to policymakers, if  China has gotten by with 
the separation of VAT and BT for so long, does it have to be fi xed today?
The imposition of a broad-based property tax on real estate ownership has 
also been a purported but elusive goal for a number of years. In the last few 
years, there has been heated discussion over whether a property tax will 
dampen real estate speculation, without any convincing conclusion.23 Well-
intentioned arguments in favor of the property tax as a welcome supplement 
to local governments’ revenue sources have also been advanced, but it is clear 
that the tax cannot in itself  plug the vertical fi scal gap that characterizes 
Chinese public fi nance.24 Finally, while the nature of  the property tax as a 
progressive tax should have been a strong argument in its favor, prevailing 
opinion seems to be that only owners of  a third apartment (or apartments 
over 200 m2) should be subject to it. At least in the public limelight, there 
are few advocates of the property tax giving convincing accounts of its true 
nature and arguing against its distortion and compromise in the course of 
policymaking. 
Major tax reform proposals have a way of taking on a faceless character in 
China: at best, they are associated with vague statements in certain offi cial 
documents (“the State Council’s 2009 Opinion on Deepening Economic 
Reform,” the “2010 Legislative Agenda,” etc.) and with ministries, but never 
with persons. Indeed, since the beginning of  China’s economic reform, 
virtually no tax bureaucrat has ever risen to political prominence, and no 
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politicians have ever claimed tax reform among their credentials. There 
are no counterparts to Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown, or Oskar Lafontaine 
(or Brian Mulroney, John Howard, or Ronald Reagan). This highlights a 
fundamental character of Chinese tax policy, namely that it seems remarkably 
insulated from the political process. There appears to be a lack of connection 
between the incentives of politicians and the wide array of tax reform options 
actually open to the country, resulting in most of these reform options lying 
dormant for long periods of time and perpetuating an ineffi cient tax system. 
The quick succession of tax measures since 2007 suggests that this is clearly 
an important area of policy to watch, but any logic that could assist prediction 
has yet to emerge. 
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Notes
1 Hence the label “production-type” (as opposed to “consumption-type”) VAT.
 2 2007 saw tax revenue growth of 33.7 percent over the previous year (Ministry of 
Finance 2008). The fi rst half  of 2008 saw tax revenue growth of 33.5 percent over 
the same period in the previous year (Ministry of Finance 2009a). 
3  However, the limited scope of VAT was unchanged; only upon further integration 
of VAT and business tax would China’s VAT become the consumption-type VAT 
adopted in most other countries. All following references to the 2009 conversion 
to a consumption-type VAT should be understood in the light of this caveat.
 4 The effective tax rate for foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) increased due to the 
repealing/phasing out of previous tax preferences. In 2008, FIE EIT revenue grew 
year-on-year by 39 percent, outpacing the growth rate for domestically owned 
enterprises by 16.2 percent. FIE EIT revenue as a proportion of total EIT revenue 
rose from 27.57 percent to 30.11 percent (Ministry of Finance 2008). 
 5 The percentages in 2007, 2008, 2009 and the fi rst three quarters of  2010 were 
7 percent, 6.87 percent, 6.64 percent, and 6.6 percent, respectively. See revenue 
analyses available at http://szs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai (accessed 
8 March 2012). 
6 Indeed, up until 2007, the government had been reducing export refunds for goods 
that either consume a high amount of energy to produce, generate high pollution, 
or use nonrenewable resources.
7 Author’s computation based on domestic VAT collected in 2009 and the proportion 
of  total VAT collected from small taxpayers as of  2007, as shown in National 
Bureau of Statistics (2008).
8 For a detailed examination of the history of transactional taxes in the Chinese real 
estate market, see Cui (2011a).
 9 See Xiong (2009). Data from the fi rst half  of 2009 suggested that the amount of 
input tax credits (equivalent to less revenue collected) resulting from VAT reform 
would slightly exceed the projection (China Taxation News 2009).
10 See “Ministry of  Finance Answers Questions Regarding the Announcement of 
Suspension of 100 items of  Administrative Fees,” http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-
11/19/content_1153530.htm (accessed 8 March 2012).
11 Ministry of Finance internal report on fi le with the author. 
12 See Wang et al. (2009). See also Ministry of Finance (2009c) (total revenue growth 
in 2009 projected to be 8 percent).
13 Annual revenue collected as a result of  tax audits hovered between 30 and 40 
billion yuan between 2002 and 2007 (Xi 2010). 
14 Computation based on Ministry of  Finance (2009b). The fee-to-tax conversion 
was expected to generate over 200 billion yuan of additional tax revenue, including 
increased VAT collection resulting from the fact that the sales amount to which 
VAT applies includes the excise tax. 
15 The Chinese fi gures in this and the next two points are computed based on 
budgetary reports similar to Ministry of Finance (2009c).
16 One prominent exception was the temporary VAT reduction to boost consumer 
spending in the UK.
17 “This happened more often through increases in allowances than cuts in rates, 
presumably also because an increase in allowances can be expected to more directly 
boost private consumption given its proportionally higher impact on lower-income 
households” (European Commission 2010b). 
18 For example, government-set purchase prices for agricultural products were raised; 
payments under the urban minimum income (dibao) program were increased; and 
subsidies were given for sales of  home appliances and vehicles in rural areas 
(Ministry of Finance 2009c). 
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19 In the fi rst three quarters of  2010, the social security fee collection growth rate 
(17.8 percent) again fell behind the growth rate of total tax revenue (24.2 percent). 
See Ministry of Finance (2010c) and “Ministry of Human Resource and Social 
Security: Five Social Security Funds Grew by 17.8%,” China News Net, 22 October 
2010, available at http://fi nance.jrj.com.cn/2010/10/2210258391140.shtml (accessed 
8 March 2012).
20 There are, of  course, substantial variations among EU member countries in the 
specifi c tax policies adopted in 2008–9 as well (European Commission 2010b: 
19–20).
21 Given observation 3 above, however, whether such explanations that refer to 
political factors unique to China are needed to explain the dominance of 
expenditure over tax in the policy response to the GFC is open to debate.
22 For an overview of the VAT and BT components of China’s indirect tax system, 
see Cui and Wu (2011).
23 The author is aware of  no focused analysis of  the expected incidence of  the 
property tax in China. According to the “capital tax” view of the property tax 
developed by US economists, the property tax is a tax on all capital, and therefore 
may not drive down the relative price of real estate (Zodrow 2007). 
24 For excellent discussions of the vertical fi scal gap in China, see Hussain and Stern 
(2008) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2008).

